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3In the current debate, much focus is on the imminent cliff 
edge: can a consensus be found on the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement or will the UK leave without such an agreement 
(‘no deal’) on 29 March 2019, prompting logistical chaos 
and legal uncertainty that will make the movement of 
people, goods, services and capital almost impossible. 
Given the imminence and severe impact of this possibility, 
it is not surprising that the focus is on this scenario. 
However, a second cliff edge is looming at the end of the 
transition period, and action must be taken now to avoid it.
A second cliff edge is looming at the end of 
the transition period, and action must be 
taken now to avoid it.
THE SECOND CLIFF EDGE
The European Commission’s draft Withdrawal Agreement1 
envisages a transition period starting on the day of the entry 
into force of the Withdrawal Agreement – likely 30 March 
2019 – and ending on 31 December 2020. The purpose 
is to allow time for negotiations on the UK’s long-term 
relationship with the EU to be completed, notwithstanding 
that the UK will cease to be a member state on 30 March 
2019. The transition period is, in effect, a standstill period, 
during which nearly all substantive provisions of EU law will 
continue to apply until the end of 2020.
While this provides some breathing space, it also implies 
that, if no long-term arrangement is agreed, the UK will, 
at the end of 2020, become in all respects a third state. 
The Withdrawal Agreement will not prevent this second 
cliff edge since its provisions merely cover the modalities 
of leaving, and the accompanying political declaration 
on the long-term relationship is nothing more than a 
statement of intent. At the end of the transition period, 
the UK will already be a non-member state, making any 
last-minute reprieve much less likely.
Finding a long-term agreement in the 21 months of 
transition will be extremely challenging, if not impossible. 
In many ways, the Withdrawal Agreement is the easy part. 
Complex, comprehensive and ambitious trade deals take 
much longer to negotiate, and this is arguably the trickiest 
one the EU has ever had to conclude, while the UK has not 
negotiated trade deals in decades. Besides, it is not merely 
a trade negotiation. The future relationship will need to 
encompass a range of interrelated policy domains, which 
are politically sensitive, such as security, justice or research 
and innovation.
Politically, the UK will find it difficult to construct a 
domestic consensus, given the competing interests that 
will all be affected by the negotiations and the pervasive 
cost of market disintegration. Most likely, there will 
be a time delay on the EU side given the institutional 
changeover in 2019. The Commission will lead the 
negotiations, but there will be no momentum until 
it is confirmed in post in October 2019, following the 
upcoming European Parliament elections. Thus, the real 
negotiations are only likely to start in the autumn of 
2019, thereby cutting negotiation time. Time will have 
to be built in for the member states and the UK to ratify 
the deal before the transition period ends2, so effectively, 
there might only be around a year to determine the long-
term relationship. Even with the best will in the world, 
and without the inevitable frictions that will arise, this is 
not enough time.
There might only be around a year to 
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FINDING AGREEMENT ON THE LONG-TERM 
RELATIONSHIP
It is in the interest of both sides to agree on the long-term 
relationship before the end of the transition period. For the 
UK, dropping out with no long-term arrangement is less 
disastrous at that point than the current ‘no deal’ possibility, 
given that more preparations and the Withdrawal 
Agreement will be in place, and some stopgap measures in 
critical areas could be agreed with the EU. The economic 
costs for the UK would, nevertheless, be considerable. Such 
an outcome would also be costly for the EU, albeit to a lesser 
degree, and, especially from a geopolitical point of view, it 
would benefit the EU to keep the UK close. 
Arguably, the underlying intention of Article 50 is to find 
agreement if this is at all possible. It demands that “the 
Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with 
that [exiting] State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future 
relationship with the Union”. The wording envisages 
that a framework for the future relationship between 
the UK and the EU will be worked out, the absence of a 
settled long-term relationship being the default if the 
negotiations run out of time.
Many, including UK Business Secretary Greg Clark3, have 
argued that it might be necessary to extend the transition 
period if it becomes clear during the transition that more 
time is needed - potentially leading to an indefinite 
process where the UK could end up in permanent 
transition, without any long-term relationship being 
settled definitively. Such a situation would raise tricky 
questions from an economic and political perspective. 
Economically, it would imply that the UK could have 
a special status or access to the Single Market not 
available to other most favoured nations the EU trades 
with. Politically, many in the EU27 are unhappy with 
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difficult to envisage how this could find a majority in the 
UK. For Brexiteers, it would be equivalent to a status of 
permanent ‘vassal state’, which they adamantly oppose. 
Moreover, the EU is legally constrained. Under EU law, 
Article 50 TEU is the legal basis for the Withdrawal 
Agreement (and the transition period specified within 
it). This provision gives the EU the competence to 
“negotiate and conclude an agreement […] setting out 
the arrangements for [the withdrawing Member State’s] 
withdrawal”. It, therefore, does not empower the Union 
to conclude an agreement dealing with the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK. To provide for 
an indefinitely renewable transition period would go well 
beyond the scope of Article 50 since it would have the 
effect of creating a new form of future relationship rather 
than an aspect of the withdrawal process.
HOW BEST TO ALLOW FOR AN EXTENSION OF 
THE TRANSITION PERIOD?
If possible, it would be best to use the Article 50 agreement 
as the basis for any extension of transition. Unless the 
Withdrawal Agreement explicitly specifies the possibility 
of a (limited) extension of the transition, any extension 
to the transition period will require concluding another 
international agreement between the EU and the UK. The 
latter would have to amend the Withdrawal Agreement 
to the effect that the transition period would run beyond 
31 December 2020. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
principle of conferral, the agreement would need to have 
an appropriate legal basis in the EU Treaties.
There are serious doubts as to whether such an 
amendment, introduced during the transition, could be 
based on Article 50 TEU. The main problem lies in the 
fact that Article 50 TEU only allows for agreements to 
be concluded between the EU and a departing member 
state. Yet, once the Withdrawal Agreement is in force, the 
UK will have ceased to be a member state, Article 50 TEU 
would therefore no longer be applicable at that point.4 
While a counter-view might point out that amendments 
to EU agreements can be concluded on the same legal 
basis as the original agreement, there is no authority to 
confirm this view with regard to Article  50 TEU. There 
is a risk that the Court of Justice might strike down such 
an extension of the transition period. Given the legal, 
economic and political chaos that would result from this, 
it is not advisable to use Article 50 as the legal basis for an 
extension of transition unless this possibility is already 
specified in the Withdrawal Agreement.
WHAT LEGAL BASIS FOR EXTENDING THE 
TRANSITION?
It would – in theory – be possible to conclude an 
agreement on a different legal basis. However, this needs 
to be carefully specified as the Union is governed by the 
principle of conferral, according to which “the Union shall 
act only within the limits of the competences conferred 
upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred 
upon the Union remain with the Member States”.5 The 
principle of conferral implies two types of constraints 
for the EU’s external action: substantive and procedural. 
Substantive constraints relate to the subject-matter. 
Procedural constraints result from the different procedures 
prescribed by the Treaties for the Union’s internal 
ratification of different types of international agreements. 
For example, to reach internal consensus, Article 50 (2) 
TEU stipulates that the Withdrawal Agreement requires 
a qualified majority in the Council and the consent of 
the European Parliament; by contrast, an association 
agreement must be concluded unanimously by the Council 
and with the consent of the European Parliament. 
If an agreement is concluded on the wrong basis or by way of 
the wrong procedure, it is liable to be declared incompatible 
with the Treaties by the European Court of Justice. This 
can happen in advance – through the ‘opinion’ procedure 
according to Article 218 (11) TFEU – or after the agreement 
has been concluded, e.g. by way of a preliminary reference 
from a national court. For these reasons, the choice of the 
correct legal basis is of constitutional importance as it 
determines the validity of the Union’s action.
On which alternative competences could such an 
agreement be based? There is no clear-cut answer. The 
Union’s external competences to conclude international 
agreements are scattered throughout the Treaties.6 In 
contrast to Article 50 TEU, which gives the EU cross-
cutting powers to deal with the arrangements for the 
withdrawal of a member state, most other provisions 
providing for the Union’s external competences relate 
to specific policy areas, such as the common commercial 
policy or environmental policy. Given the scope of 
the EU-UK relationship, basing an extension on these 
competences would require a bundled approach. For 
instance, the trade aspects of transition would be covered 
by the Union’s exclusive competence over the common 
commercial policy; jurisdiction over private law disputes 
and enforcement of judgments could be based on implied 
powers;7 and so on. However, there is no guarantee that all 
the EU’s external competences combined would suffice. In 
fact, some of the political aspects of quasi-EU membership, 
such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy that is set 
to continue to apply to the UK throughout the transition, 
would warrant the conclusion of a mixed agreement.
Mixed agreements are concluded by the EU and the 
member states on one side and a third country on the 
other. By bringing the member states as parties into the 
agreement, the EU-side can plug any competency gaps that 
might exist under the EU Treaties. The disadvantage of this 
kind of arrangement is that it is procedurally cumbersome: 
not only must the EU ratify the agreement – usually by way 
of unanimity in the Council and consent of the European 
Parliament – but each of its 27 member states must do 
the same according to their respective constitutional 
requirements. This will in most cases involve a vote in the 
national parliament but may also require more, such as 
the consent of a regional parliament or even a referendum. 
In recent years the Parliament of Wallonia voted against 
CETA, the EU’s free trade agreement with Canada, and 
the Dutch people rejected an act approving the EU’s 
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Using a mixed agreement would thus make the ratification 
process – for which there may only be a short window 
in practice – subject to additional uncertainties such as 
challenges in national constitutional courts.
The inclusion of an explicit clause in the 
Withdrawal Agreement allowing for a time-
limited extension of the transition period 
based on Article 50 TEU is the best option.
PROVISION FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE 
TRANSITION
For these reasons, the inclusion of an explicit clause in 
the Withdrawal Agreement allowing for a time-limited 
extension of the transition period based on Article  50 
TEU is the best option. Based on Article 50 TEU, it would, 
therefore, avoid the legal difficulties that alternative 
solutions would imply. 
Specifically, paragraphs 2 to 4, below, should be added to 
Article 121 of the Withdrawal Agreement.
Article  121 Transition Period
1 q There shall be a transition or implementation period, 
which shall start on the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement and end on 31 December 2020.
2 q The initial transition period in paragraph  1 may be 
extended once for an additional period of one year at 
the request of the Union or the United Kingdom. The 
decision to extend the transition period may be taken 
by the European Council acting unanimously and in 
agreement with the United Kingdom. The decision to 
extend the transition period must be made before the 
end of the initial transition period and only after the 
procedure in paragraph 4 is completed. 
3 q During the additional transition period, Articles   
122-126 shall apply in the same manner as during 
the initial transition period. During the additional 
transition period, the United Kingdom shall 
contribute to the Union’s budgets.
4 q The request to extend the transition period must be 
communicated to the other party. Following this 
request, the European Commission shall produce a 
proposal containing estimates of the costs for the 
United Kingdom’s participation in Union policies and 
programmes during the additional transition period. 
On the basis of this proposal, the Council, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, 
shall adopt a decision determining the United 
Kingdom’s financial contribution to the Union’s 
budgets for the additional transition period.
EXPLANATION OF THE DRAFT PROVISION
1. LEGAL BASIS
Article 50 TEU is the legal basis for including the option 
of extending the transition period. As explained above, a 
strictly time-limited transition period can appropriately 
be based on Article  50 TEU since a transition period 
can be considered part of the arrangements for the 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU. Following the same 
rationale, Article  50 TEU also provides an appropriate 
basis for a possibility of extending that period.
The following points should be reiterated, however: 
Article 50 TEU cannot serve as the legal basis for a future 
relationship between the EU and the UK. The more 
specific bases, such as Article 207 TFEU for a free trade 
agreement, take precedence for two reasons. First, they 
are more specific in terms of substance. Second, they 
contain different – and often harder to fulfil – procedural 
requirements. For instance, a free trade agreement 
between the EU and the UK that covers trade in all 
services would require a unanimous decision in the 
Council.8  By contrast, Article  50 TEU only requires a 
qualified majority.
The limits of Article 50 TEU as a legal basis, therefore, 
mean that the inclusion of any possibility for an 
extension of the transition period must not allow for the 
transition to morph into a permanent relationship. It 
rules out an unlimited number of extensions as otherwise 
transition could, in theory, be extended on an annual 
basis and thereby become a permanent state in practice. 
For this reason, the proposal is for a one-off extension.
The duration of the proposed additional transition 
period is one year. An alternative approach would be to 
allow both sides to agree on an additional transition of 
‘up to one year’ or something similar. However, this would 
carry additional budgetary difficulties that would be best 
avoided by allowing for an extension of one calendar year 
only, coinciding with the annual EU budget. 
While politically a longer additional transition period 
might be desirable to, for example, ensure that a UK 
General Election has to take place within the extended 
transition period, it is legally risky. The same limits 
to Article 50 TEU mean that the overall transition 
phase cannot be so long as to practically amount to a 
permanent settlement of the relationship between the EU 
and the UK. The current draft provides for 21 months; a 
possibility to extend this by one year – as proposed here 
– would bring the total duration to 33 months. Arguably, 
it is impossible to determine the permissible length of a 
transition period with exact precision for lack of guidance 
in the Treaties or from the Court of Justice. In this paper, 
it is suggested that the main factor in that assessment 
should be the purpose of the transition period - which is 
to allow enough time for the EU and the UK to negotiate 
and ratify one or several agreement(s) concerning 
their future relationship - on the basis of the political 
declaration (that constitutes ‘the framework for [their] 
future relationship’) as envisaged by Article 50 (2) TEU. If 
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this takes longer to negotiate and finalise than a more 
basic one. Given past practical experience of EU free trade 
negotiations, a period of five years for the entire process 
– from its start on 29 March 2017 to finish at the end of 
2021 – would seem to be appropriate.
Given that the fundamental political decisions in this 
regard can be expected to have been made as part of the 
overall framework by the time the Withdrawal Agreement 
enters into force – i.e. two years after the notification under 
Article 50 TEU was sent – an overall maximum transition 
period of just under three years – as proposed here – 
should be therefore covered by the purpose of Article  
50 TEU. Hence the possibility to extend the 21-month 
transition period by one year to an overall duration of 33 
months can lawfully be based on Article  50 TEU.
2. EXTENSION PROCEDURE 
The draft provision envisages a procedure that will 
require the unanimous consent of the European Council 
(i.e. the EU27 heads of state or government) and of the 
UK in order to bring about an extension of the transition 
period. Neither side can, therefore, be forced into a longer 
transition. Due to the far-reaching legal implications 
of an extension for the legal orders of the EU27, it is 
imperative that each member state be directly involved in 
the decision-making process resulting in an extension. 
Given the obvious parallels to the extension of the Article  
50-period, it is appropriate to mirror the procedure for 
the extension of the two-year period in Article  50 (3) 
TEU by requiring a unanimous decision by the European 
Council and the agreement of the withdrawing member 
state. This way the consent of each member state and the 
consent of the UK must be secured.9
A further question is whether there should be a cut-off 
point after which an extension request will no longer 
be possible. There would be the distinct advantage of 
providing a degree of certainty to the EU institutions, 
the member states, the UK, and all other stakeholders. 
Meanwhile, a strict cut-off point – say three months 
before the end of the transition period – might prove to 
be too rigid and indeed counter-productive.
That said, the request for an extension cannot be made at 
the last minute given that an additional transition period 
has budgetary implications, which would need to be 
determined by the EU institutions. Paragraph 4 proposes a 
procedure – explained in more detail below – to determine 
in advance the financial contribution the UK would need 
to make during the additional transition period. Paragraph 
2 stipulates that the European Council and the UK cannot 
make its decision before the completion of that procedure. 
This has the advantage that the UK will know precisely 
what it commits to financially before agreeing to an 
extension of the transition period. Therefore, in practice, 
the parties must allow some time for this procedure to 
take place, which means that a request for an extension of 
transition cannot be submitted at the last minute.
3. EFFECTS OF AN EXTENDED TRANSITION
Paragraph 3 of the draft provision makes it clear that 
during any extension of the transition the same legal rules 
as the initial transition period would apply. In particular, 
Union law will remain applicable in the UK with the same 
effects as in the EU and its member states – with the 
exceptions noted in Article 122 of the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement. The UK will remain outside the decision-
making processes of the EU (Articles 123 (1) and (6) of 
the draft Withdrawal Agreement). At the same time, the 
EU’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies – including 
the Court of Justice – will retain their enforcement and 
supervision powers as provided for in the Treaties. 
Furthermore, paragraph 3 emphasises that the UK 
will need to make financial contributions during any 
additional transition period.
4. BUDGETARY ISSUES
After stating that the request to extend the transition 
period must be communicated to the other party10, the 
fourth paragraph of the draft provision deals with the 
procedure to determine the UK’s contribution.
The end of the initial transition period will coincide 
with the end of the EU’s current Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF – running from 2014-2020), which had 
been drawn up with the UK as a member state in mind. 
Article 128 of the Withdrawal Agreement provides that 
during the original transition period (until 31 December 
2020) the UK “shall contribute to and participate in the 
implementation of the Union’s budgets”. Such financial 
contribution does not require changes to the current MFF 
since the latter already assumes the UK’s participation as 
a member state.
The next MFF (2021-2027) will no longer assume that the 
UK is a member state and will, therefore, set the ceilings for 
EU’s spending accordingly. At the same time, an extension 
of transition on the terms laid down in the Withdrawal 
Agreement would entail costs for the Union: the UK would 
continue to participate in EU programmes and policies. 
These costs will need to be covered by the UK.
Paragraph 3 already sets out the rule that the UK shall 
contribute to the EU’s budgets during the additional 
transition period. Paragraph 4 foresees the procedure  
for determining the UK’s financial contribution for the 
year 2021.
This procedure is modelled on Article 314 TFEU and 
involves the same institutional actors. The Council 
and the European Parliament would therefore have to 
approve a proposal made by the Commission. Arguably, 
it would be appropriate to involve the same actors – and 
in particular the European Parliament – as they are also 
responsible for the annual EU budget. 
Coupled with paragraph 2, which stipulates that a 
decision to extend the transition period may only be 
taken after the UK’s financial contribution has been 
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determined, this procedure ensures that both sides are 
aware of the financial implications of an additional 
transition period before the European Council and the UK 
agree on an extension.
HOW LIKELY IS THE INCLUSION OF SUCH AN 
EXTENSION CLAUSE?
Many commentators in the EU and the UK have noted 
the tight negotiation schedule and thus the benefits 
of a possible extension of transition. There have 
been numerous press reports speculating that the UK 
government will ask for the inclusion of such a clause and 
that the EU27 - and Task Force 50 in particular - are open 
to the inclusion of such a provision. Formally, however, 
the UK will have to ask for it at some point during the 
negotiations. Speculation is that this will happen last 
minute, given how contentious this is likely to be with 
Brexiteers in the UK. But there are good defensive lines: 
the extension is limited in time and will only be used 
if both sides agree. An extension of transition provides 
more time to find a solution for Northern Ireland. The 
Prime Minister can also commit to fully involve the House 
of Commons in any decision on extending transition. In 
the end, the Brexiteers will still get their main prize: the 
UK will leave on 29 March 2019, even if the transition 
period might then last for 33 months instead of 21.
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXTENSION 
OF TRANSITION
Having a possible extension of transition could change 
the political dynamics in the UK. Not only does an 
extension make different outcomes feasible, but the 
political debate around an extension will also take place 
in a very different environment. In March 2019, Brexit 
will have happened, so Leavers can claim that the result 
of the referendum has been honoured. Consequently, 
the political debate can focus more easily on how the 
status quo can be maintained to avoid the economic 
costs associated with a limited trade deal, while the 
payment of additional money to merely stay in transition 
might highlight the desirability of fully participating in 
beneficial EU policies and programmes.
An extension of transition does not 
guarantee a better outcome. It buys some 
time and can help to change the political 
environment of the UK domestic debate. 
However, to have any chance of becoming 
a reality, the provisions will have to be 
included in the Withdrawal Agreement.
In the end, an extension of transition does not guarantee 
a better outcome. It buys some time and can help to 
change the political environment of the UK domestic 
debate. However, to have any chance of becoming a 
reality, the provisions will have to be included in the 
Withdrawal Agreement. If they wish to avoid a second 
cliff edge, both sides should not lose sight of the need to 
do so, as proposed in this paper.
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